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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of Judge David E.
Roth heard

in the Second

Judicial District in and for Weber

County, State of Utah, concerning the title to real property.

NATURE OF CASE
This case involves a determination as to the title of
real

property.

The

appellants

claim

that

the property

conveyed by Deed to be held in trust for them.

was

The respondents

claim they hold both legal and equitable title to the property by
reason of Deed subject only to a life estate in the appellants.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiffs/appellants filed a Complaint against the
defendants/respondents in the Weber County District Court.

The

matter was tried, non-jury, before Judge David E. Roth on the
25th and 26th of May, 1988.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Judgment was signed by Judge Roth on the 21st day of
June, 1988.
The

plaintiffs/appellants

Court on the 21st day of July, 1988.

appealed

to Utah

Supreme

This matter was transferred

from the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on the 6th
day of February, 1989.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The

district

court

judge, David

E.

Roth,

setting

without a jury, entered a judgment in this matter on the 21st day
of June, 1988.

The court found that the defendants/respondents

own the Fee Title to the real property in question subject to a
life estate in the plaintiffs/appellants.

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
The plaintiff/appellants, hereinafter
the

appellants,

Opheikens.

are

Joseph

Opheikens

and

referred
his

wife

to as
Fanny

The defendants/respondents, hereinafter referred to

as the respondents, are Arthur C. Sheron and his wife Barbara 0.
Sheron.

The parties will be referred

to by

appellants

and

respondents and by their names in order to identify the source of
some of the testimony.
of

the

court

record

Reference will be made to the page number
rather

than to the page

number

of

the

transcript.
The

appellants

are

the parents

of

the

respondent,

Barbara 0. Sheron, and at the time of the trial were 80 years of
age.

(Record, p.231)

Prior to 1953, Barbara Sheron had been

married to an individual by the name of Jack Griven.

He died in

an automobile accident in 1953 and as a result of that accident
Barbara Sheron received $1,900.00 and an insurance policy that
paid her $92.90 per month.

After the death of her first husband,

Barbara Sheron and her daughter from that marriage, Kathleen,
lived with the appellants. (R.315)

Upon receiving the $1,900.00

from the death of her first husband, Barbara Sheron suggested
that the appellants build a home on a lot they owned.
2

Barbara

Sheron used the $1,900.00 she had received from her husband's
death to construct the home.

In addition, she worked along side

her father during the entire construction of the home.
317)

(R.316-

The appellants borrowed $4,500.00 from Froerer Corporation

to finish the home and at a later time borrowed an additional
$700.00 from Froerer Corporation to install cabinets in the home.
(R.239)
the

Barbara Sheron paid $92.90 on the mortgage borrowed by

appellants

for a period of one year.

She and her new

husband, Arthur C. Sheron, lived in the home for a period of
three

months

after

it was

constructed.

(R.318-319)

The

respondents moved to a home that was adjacent to the property on
which the new home had been built and which the appellants were
occupying.
The

appellant,

Fanny

financial matters for her family.

Opheikens,
(R.232)

handled

all

the

Fanny Opheikens liked

to gamble and played Bingo seven nights a week.

(R.320-321)

She

used the money from her husband's paycheck to cover her gambling
losses and consequently became delinquent in the moneys owed on
the mortgages and taxes on the home.

In 1957 Froerer demanded

payment of the $700.00 which had been loaned to the appellants to
install the cabinets.

The appellants were unable to provide the

money so the respondents borrowed the money and paid the debt to
Froerer.

(R.319-320, 364-365)

$700.00 because

Froerer made the demand on the

the appellant, Fanny Opheikens had not been

making the interest and/or mortgage payments required under the
mortgage and the loan on the $700.00.
3

Between June of 1958 and

December of 1967 the appellants had paid nothing towards the
principal on the home mortgage•

(Exhibit 12, R.282)

When the

respondents paid the $700.00, Froerer reinstated the mortgage,
but increased the monthly payments to $110.00 per month.

(R.364)

In approximately December of 1967, the appellant Fanny
Opheikens informed the respondents that the house was being
foreclosed by Froerer because she had not paid taxes for a period
of five years.

The property had been advertised and placed for

sale for delinquent taxes by the county.

(R.321-322)

neighbor, Elizabeth Dale, who was a close

A

friend of the

appellant Joseph Opheikens, also became aware of the fact that
the property was being placed for a tax sale and was interested
in purchasing the home.

(R.417)

The respondent Arthur Sheron

met with the appellant Joseph Opheikens and suggested that the
respondents would acquire the money to pay the taxes which
amounted to $1,028.00.

Joseph Opheikens informed the respondent

that he was a damn fool and that he should let Froerer have the
home.

(R.367)

The respondents borrowed $1,028*00 from Joe

Deemer and agreed to pay the taxes on the condition that the
appellants would deed the home over to them.

The appellant Fanny

Opheikens suggested that a Quit Claim Deed be drafted by her
attorney

Ira Huggins.

(R.368-369)

A deed was drafted by

attorney Ira Huggins at a meeting between Mr. Huggins, Fanny
Opheikens, and Arthur Sheron.

At that time Attorney Huggins

informed Fanny Opheikens that if she signed the deed she would be
giving up all ownership to the home to the respondents.
4

(R.369-

370)

The deed was then taken back to Joseph Opheikens and the

appellants signed the deed the next day in front of a notary.
(R.370)

The respondents told the appellants that they could

continue to live in the house during their lifetime if they would
pay

the

remaining

mortgage

and

taxes

on

respondents paid the insurance on the home.

the

home.

The

(R.372-373, 325-326)

The appellants had represented to the respondents and
to others that they always intended the home to go to their
daughter Barbara Sheron and to her oldest daughter Kathleen Lilly
because the home had been built from the insurance money received
from the death of Barbara's first husband and Kathleen's father.
(R.318,

363)

statements.

The

appellants

deny

that

they made

any

such

However, other witnesses testified that they had

heard the appellants make the statements.

One of those witnesses

was Elizabeth Dale, an old time friend of the appellants who had
known them since 1957, and had social contact with them daily.
(R.412-413)

Elizabeth Dale testified that Joseph Opheikens told

her on a number of occasions that the home was to belong to
Barbara and her oldest daughter because of the insurance money
that had been invested in the home. (R.415-416)
testified

that

she

had

been

told

by

the

Elizabeth Dale

appellant

Joseph

Opheikens that he would not have a roof over his head if it had
not been for what the respondents had done for him. (R.420-421)
Kathleen

Lilly

testified

that

she

recalled

hearing

her

grandmother say the house was to go to her and her mother Barbara
Sheron because it was built with blood money.
5

(R.443-444)

Vanna

Sandburg, the daughter of Arthur and Barbara Sheron, testified
that she was close to her grandparents and that her grandmother
would

make

a point of telling

her that

the home

after

the

appellants death would be going to Barbara Sheron and Vanna's
sister Kathleen Lilly.
The

Quit

(R.454)

Claim

Deed

deeding

the property

from

the

appellants to the respondents was signed on the 7th day December,
1967. (Ex.1)

The respondents from that time on maintained the

yard, plowed the snow, built a patio, and performed other work on
the

property

(R. 331-332,

for which

they did not

374-375, 447)

charge

The respondents

the

appellants.

did not have any

complaints from the appellants until approximately 1984 when they
received a letter from an attorney representing the appellants
claiming that they held the home in trust for the appellants.
(R.330)

The respondents refused to turn the house over to the

appellants and the appellants filed a Complaint in this matter.
The Complaint alleged that the respondents were holding the house
in trust

for the

appellants.

However, the appellant

Joseph

Opheikens testified at the trial that he had never informed the
respondents that they were holding the house in trust for him.
(R.229)
asked

The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified that she had

that

the home be returned

to the appellants, but

respondents said they would not do so.

(R.299)

the

Fanny Opheikens

testified that when the Deed was executed, she did not have a
close relationship with her daughter and had an uncomfortable
relationship with her

son-in-law.
6

She also

testified

that she

did not have
respondents.

a confidential
(R.295-296)

relationship with either of the

Joseph Opheikens was very confused in

his testimony and stated that the whole matter was a puzzle to
him.

(R.221)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS OWN THE FEE TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY.
The respondents received a Quit Claim Deed from the
appellants for the real property in question on the 7th day of
December, 1967.

(Ex.1)

Judge Roth, after hearing this case,

entered a judgment which stated in part, "It is hereby ordered
that the defendants own the Fee Title to the following described
property subject to a life estate in Joseph Opheikens and Fanny
Opheikens;..."

The Court in its bench ruling stated as follows:

One fact I can find for certain, and that is
that in my opinion, based upon the evidence,
the plaintiffs did quit claim their interest
to this property to the defendants. That the
claimed document is clear on its face. And
there is no question as to what its effect
is. And I am satisfied that both plaintiffs
signed that deed. There is no evidence that
in 1967 that either plaintiff was in poor
health or of unsound mind. (R.470)
Paragraph

3 of

the

original

Complaint of the appellants

Complaint

acknowledges

executed a deed to the respondents.

and

of

the

that the

Amended

appellants

That allegation was admitted

by the respondents in their answer.

Judge Roth ruled at the

beginning of the trial that the appellants had admitted that they

7

had executed the deed and that would not be an issue during the
trial. (R.193-195)
In Baker

v.

Pattee,

684 P.2d

632

(Utah

1984) the

Supreme Court said that there is a presumption of validity upon
the delivery of a deed and that a party attacking the validity of
a written instrument such as a deed must do so by clear and
convincing evidence.

The court also stated:

...This court will disturb the findings of
fact in equity cases only where the evidence
clearly preponderates against them... We are
not bound to substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court, and because of its
advantages position, we give considerable
deference to its findings and judgment....
In the case of In re Estate of Ruth H. Hock v. Jack M. Fennemore,
655 P.2d

111 (Utah 1982) the court considered a case in which

there was an allegation of a constructive trust.

The court

stated:
In this case, as in most cases involving
constructive or resulting trust, we are
called upon to alter a deed or other writing
which is regulated in form and is presumed to
convey a clear and unambiguous title. When
such a deed or document is attacked, the
party alleging the variance must prove the
claim by clear and convincing evidence....
The burden was upon the appellants to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the deed did not convey Fee Title to
the

respondents

and/or

imposed on the property.

that

a constructive

trust

should

be

The respondents admitted during the

course of the trial that they had agreed that the
would have a life estate in the property.

appellants

The court therefore

concluded that the respondents owned the Fee Title subject only

to a life estate in favor of the appellants.

The appellants did

not present any testimony that would invalidate the deed or place
any restriction on the real property other than that agreed to by
the respondents.
that

they

evidence
Instead

met

The appellants do not contend in their Brief
the burden of producing

which would
the

justify

appellants

the

attempt

clear

invalidation

to switch

and

convincing

of the

deed.

the burden to the

respondents as indicated in Point III of the appellants' Brief.
The appellants' Brief claims that the appellants were
not adequately compensated for the deed which they executed to
the respondents.

The appellants' Brief relies entirely upon the

testimony of the appellants to support this contention.

The

Supreme Court has held in may cases that it will review the
evidence presented in the trial court in the light most favorable
to

the

prevailing

party

or

the

respondents.

The

evidence

presented by the respondents as set forth in the Statement of
Facts clearly demonstrates that the findings of the judge in
favor of the respondents was supported by the evidence.
The home which was quit claim deeded to the respondents
was originally built at the suggestion of the respondent Barbara
Sheron from $1,900.00 insurance money that she received from the
death of her husband.

(R.315)

Barbara Sheron worked side by

side with her father in constructing the home. (R.316-317)
appellants borrowed

The

$4,500.00 to finish the home and Barbara

Sheron paid the mortgage payment for a period of one year after
the home was built although she and her new husband only lived in
9

the home

for three months.

(R.239, 318-319)

After Barbara

Sheron had stopped making the mortgage payments, the appellant
Fanny Opheikens, because of her gambling, failed to make the
payments on a regular basis thereby resulting in a threatened
foreclosure by the mortgage holder.
keep

the

house

from

being

(R.282, Ex. 12)

foreclosed,

In order to

the respondents

paid

$700.00 to the mortgage holder so that the mortgage would be
reinstated.

(R.364)

Thereafter,

in December

of

1968

the

mortgage holder again threatened to foreclose on the home because
the appellants had not paid property taxes for a period of five
years.

(R.321-322)

The respondents borrowed $1,028.00 and paid

the taxes on the basis that the property would be deeded to them
by the appellants.

The Quit Claim Deed was drafted by the

appellants' attorney. (R.368-369)

After the property was deeded

to the respondents, the respondents paid the insurance on the
home and told the appellants they could continue to live in the
home

during

their

lifetime

if they would

pay

the

mortgage and keep the taxes current on the home.
325-326)

(R.372-373,

After the property was deeded to the respondents, they

maintained
property

remaining

the home
for

compensation.

which

and performed
they

did

not

other
ask

improvements
and

did

not

on the
receive

(R.331-332, 374-375, 447)

Judge Roth found that there was no good evidence before
the court as to what the value of the home would have been in
1967 and that the appellants did not present any evidence of
value.

The only evidence presented was the estimate of the
10

respondent Arthur Sheron that the home would have been worth
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00 in 1967.

The court also found from the

evidence presented by the respondents that other homes in the
area during this time period were selling for very modest
amounts.

(R.472-473)

Judge Roth found that the respondents had

contributed a total of $3,628.00 for the construction of the home
and to avoid foreclosure on the home and concluded that this was
a reasonable price given the fact that the appellants were
receiving a life estate in the home.

(R.472-473)

In order to prevail on their Complaint, the appellants
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was
not valid or that it was being held in trust for them by the
respondents.

The appellants did not present any evidence to the

effect that the property was being held in trust for them by the
respondents.

The appellant Joseph Opheikens was asked whether or

not he had ever informed the respondents that he thought they
were holding the ownership of the home in trust for him.

His

answer was no, that no discussion was ever had concerning the
matter.

(R.229)

The appellants did not present any evidence

that would justify their claim that the deed was invalid or that
the respondents had been unjustly enriched.

POINT II
THE APPELLANTS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD AND/OR
MISCONSTRUED THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
The appellants have appealed on the basis that the
11

trial

court

remainder

committed

interest

error

in

awarding

basis

respondents

a

in the property which they claim was not

requested in the respondents' pleadings.
other

the

for the

appeal.

The

There seems to be no

appellants

misconstrued the ruling of Judge Roth.

obviously

have

Judge Roth found that the

Fee Title to the land was transferred by Quit Claim Deed from the
appellants

to the respondents, but that the respondents

had

agreed to give the appellants a life estate in the property.
Judge

Roth

stated

in his

decision

from

the bench

that

the

respondents ended up with a remainder interest in the property.
However, he did not award the respondents a remainder interest as
alleged by the appellants.

In fact the respondents, by agreeing

to a life estate, retained a reversion interest.

A remainder

interest can only be created in favor of a stranger to the deed
and

therefore

cannot

Corneluis J.,

apply

to

the

respondents.

Moynihah,

INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, p. Ill

(West Publishing Company, 1962)

While Judge Roth

made reference

to a remainder, he ruled that the respondents owned the fee to
the real property subject only to a life estate in the appellants
which

legally

created

a

reversion

interest.

While

the

distinction between the two interests are subtle, it is clear
that the judge did not impose a constructive trust against the
appellants which resulted in the respondents having a remainder
interest.
The

appellants

incorrect

assumption

that

the

court

imposed a constructive trust upon the respondents runs throughout
12

the appellants1 Brief.

Consequently, the arguments contained in

the Brief are not relevant.

This is demonstrated by Point II of

the appellants' Brief wherein they contend that the respondents
were

granted

pleadings.
were

the

relief

which

they

did

not

request

in

their

The respondents at all times maintained that they
fee

owners

of

the

property.

Had

the

appellants

understood the court's ruling, there would be no reason for the
argument contained in Point II of the Brief.

In Point I of the

appellants'

imposition

Brief,

they

argue

that

the

of

a

constructive trust in favor of the respondents has the effect of
reconveying the real property or restoring the real property to
the former owners or the appellants.

The appellants then argue

that the court did not reconvey the property to the appellants
and therefore committed error in creating a constructive trust
for the respondents.

This argument makes no sense in light of

the fact that the court held that the respondents were the fee
owners of the property and that a constructive trust was imposed
against the respondents in favor of the appellants in the form of
a life estate.

POINT III
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS ON APPEAL
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.
It is hard to tell from the appellants' Brief what
relief they are asking of this court.

13

The only part of the

appellants' Brief that addresses that issue is the conclusion.
Apparently the appellants are not asking for a new trial, but are
asking the court to reverse the trial court's decision and rule
that the appellants own the Fee Title to the real property and
that the only right the respondents have is to be paid back the
moneys they have invested in the home.
The Court of Appeals in an equity case does have the
right to enter an order based upon the evidence given in the
lower court.

The Supreme Court has held that in the review of an

equity case, the trial court's findings of fact and ruling should
not

be

disturbed

unless

the

evidence

against the lower court ruling.

clearly

preponderates

Hock v. Fennemore, supra.

The

Supreme Court has also stated that considerable deference should
be

given

to

the

findings

advantaged

position.

additional

reason

why

of

a trial

court

because

Baker v. Pattee, supra.
the

court

should

not

of

There

its

is an

substitute

its

judgment for that of the trial court in this case.
It is the position of the respondents that the court
committed

error

imposing

a

life

in a couple of instances in its decision in
estate

in

favor

of

the

appellants.

The

respondents elected not to appeal on those issues because they
were willing to allow the appellants to have a life estate in the
property.
It was the respondents' position that the appellants
action was barred by the Statue of Limitations.
case was executed in 1967.

The deed in this

The appellants did not
14

instigate

their action until after 1984, more than 17 years after the date
of the deed.

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker v.

Pattee, supra, held that the statute of limitations in an action
for the cancelation of a deed was controlled by U.C.A. § 78-1225(2) which provides for a four year statute of limitations. The
court stated that in case of undue influence and/or duress, the
limitation period begins with the termination of the influence or
duress.
The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified that she was
aware that the respondents did not intend to return the property
to her as early as 1968. (R.298-299) The appellants did not claim
that there was any undue influence or duress.

The appellant

Joseph Opheikens did not make any claim of a confidential
relationship, undue influence, or duress.

He stated that he did

not tell the respondents that they were holding the house in
trust for him. (R.229)

His sole complaint was that he did not

remember signing the deed and that the whole matter was a puzzle
to him. (R.208, 221)

The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified

that when the deed was executed in 1967 she did not have a close
relationship with her daughter, had an uncomfortable relationship
with her son-in-law, and did not have a confidential relationship
with either of the respondents. (R.295-296)

She also stated that

in 1967 she was approximately 60 years of age as was her husband
and that both she and her husband were in good health and of
clear mind. (R.297-298)

Judge Roth found that there was no

evidence that the respondents

manipulated or put undue
15

pressure

on the appellants.

He also found that neither attempted to take

advantage of the appellants. (R.470-471)
It seems clear that the statute of limitations on
this action began to run at the time the deed was executed, which
was

1967,

or

when

the

appellants

clearly

knew

that

the

respondents did not intend to return the property to them which
would have been in 1968.
was

barred

by

the

Consequently, the appellants' action

statute

of

limitations

after

1972.

The

respondents made a motion at the beginning and during the trial
to dismiss the actions because of the statute of limitations.
The court refused to grant the motion and stated:

"...and for

the reason I don't think it is a very satisfying way to end this
litigation in a family case." (R.313)

The respondents did not

appeal from the court's failure to dismiss the case because of
the statute of limitations because the respondents were willing
to abide by the court's decision.

However, if the Court of

Appeals elects to overturn the court's decision and enter an
order

without

referring

the

matter

for

a new

trial,

the

respondents would be denied an opportunity to pursue a remedy
which they might have appealed if any decision other than the one
by Judge Roth was imposed upon them.
The respondents believe that the court committed

an

error in ruling that a life estate was created by a constructive
trust as opposed to an express trust.
appeal

from

Judge Roth's ruling
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The respondents did not

in this regard because they

agreed that there was an express trust and were willing to be
bound

by

the

life

estate.

At

the

conclusion

of

the

case

presented by the appellants, the respondents made a motion for a
dismissal

on the basis that the appellants had presented no

evidence concerning an express trust.

The appellants' attorney

Stephen Farr conceded that they were not trying the action on the
basis

of

an express

constructive trust.

trust, but

rather

on

the

theory

of a

Judge Roth ruled that there was no evidence

that had been presented by the appellants that supported

the

existence of an express trust and granted the respondents' motion
to dismiss on that basis.

Judge Roth continued the trial solely

on the theory of whether or not there was a constructive trust
that should be imposed against the respondents. (R.273-276) Had
the appellants called the respondents to testify as part of their
case, they would have learned that there was an express trust;
but since the appellants did not carry their burden, they lost
the opportunity to prevail on that theory.
The theory of constructive trust was considered by the
Utah Supreme Court in Histsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d
1987).

1024 (Utah

In that case Justice Zimmerman stated the burden of proof

is on the party asserting a constructive trust to prove the case
by clear and convincing evidence and that the burden of proving a
constructive trust cannot be met by simply showing that there was
a transaction between close family members.

He stated that in

order to impose a constructive trust, in addition to the family
relationship,

there must be shown age and
17

infirmity,

actual

dominance, a course of management of the affairs of another, or
other facts making it inequitable to deny a constructive trust.
He stated in part:
.•.Indeed, the court was required to presume
that the transaction was in all respects
regular, absent evidence to the contrary....
A constructive

trust cannot be imposed upon the

respondents because there was a family relationship involved in
this transaction.

There was no evidence

showing

age or

infirmity, actual dominance, a course of management of the
affairs of another, or any other fact which would demonstrate
that it was inequitable to deny a constructive trust.
After dismissing the appellants' action on an express
trust, Judge Roth continued the trial and heard the testimony of
the respondents to the effect that they had agreed to give the
appellants a life estate.

Consequently, Judge Roth found himself

in a position where he wanted to impose a life estate on the
property, but could not do so because of an express trust.
Therefore, he found there was a constructive trust imposing a
life estate even though the evidence was not sufficient to
justify such a finding.

The appellants did not appeal this error

on the part of the trial court because they believe the results
were equitable.

However, if this court were to substitute its

order for that of the trial court, a result could occur which was
not anticipated by the respondents and the respondents would be
denied an opportunity to pursue a remedy which they might have
otherwise appealed.
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CONCLUSION
The respondents are the owners of the Fee Title to the
property in question by reason of a Quit Claim Deed from the
appellants.

The appellants did not sustain their burden of

demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the deed
given to the respondents was invalid or that the property was
being held in trust for the appellants.

The trial court did not

impose upon the appellants a constructive trust resulting in a
remainder

interest

appellants.

in the respondents

as alleged by the

The court clearly ruled that the respondents owned

the Fee Title to the property subject only to a life estate in
the appellants.

This resulted in the respondents having a

reversion interest in the property instead of a remainder
interest as alleged by the appellants.
The relief sought by the appellants is not clear.
However, it would be manifestly unjust for the Court of Appeals
to substitute its ruling for that of the trial court.

The

respondents believe that the trial court committed an error in
failing to dismiss the action as being barred by the statute of
limitations and in determining that there was a constructive
trust imposed against the respondents for a life estate in favor
of the appellants.

The respondents' did not appeal these issues

because they believe the ultimate result of the court's order was
equitable.

However, if the appellate court were to substitute

its judgment for that of the trial court, the respondents would
19

be denied an opportunity to pursue remedies which they might have
appealed if the decision had been other than as rendered by the
trial judge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1989.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Respondents
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